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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING FRAUD AS A MATTER OF 
LAW WHERE FACTS WERE CLEARLY IN DISPUTE. 
As his lead argument in response to Appellants' Brief, Reott asserts that "the 
District Court did not make 'findings'" but rather did nothing more than apply facts to 
law in reaching the conclusion that there was a fraudulent transfer. Reott Br 14-17. 
Reott acknowledges that the Fraudulent Transfer Act requires a finding of "actual intent 
to defraud, hinder or delay" a creditor, but then asserts that actual intent is too "difficult 
to prove absent an outright admission" so the law allows intent to be proved through 
"badges of fraud." Reott Br 15. Proving badges of fraud (Reott contends) substitutes for 
proof of actual intent: "[I]f certain codified and common law factors [i.e., the 'badges of 
fraud'] are established, 'actual intent' may be proven and the statutory elements are 
established." Reott Br 16. In Reott's view, proof of fraud is simple arithmetic — 
evidence of even one "badge of fraud" equates to proving a fraudulent transfer as a 
matter of law, with no need to hear live testimony, weigh evidence or make any further 
inquiry. Reott Br 39. 
Reott's only authority for this remarkable assertion is Territorial Savings & Loan 
Ass 'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), in which this Court made the 
unremarkable point that "badges of fraud" "throw suspicion on a transaction." Reott Br 
15. However, even a cursory reading of Territorial Savings makes clear that this case 
does not support Reott's extravagant contention that the existence of a "badge of fraud" 
mandates a finding of fraudulent intent. To the contrary, within four sentences of the 
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phrase Reott highlights, the Territorial Savings court set forth the following points that 
govern any finding of fraud based on alleged "badges of fraud": 
• "Actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by clear 
and convincing evidence"; 
• "Fraudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of fact..."; 
• Badges of fraud "do not of themselves or per se constitute fraud"; 
• "Their value as evidence is relative, not absolute"; 
• "They are not usually conclusive proof; they are open to explanation"; and 
• Their weight varies according to "the special circumstances attending the 
case." 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Montana Nat 'I Bank v. Michels, 631 P.2d 1260, 1263 
(Mont. 1981)). 
In granting partial summary judgment in favor of Reott, Judge Bryner engaged in 
fact finding on two levels: first, he determined that certain isolated facts were "material," 
/. e., they were "badges of fraud," and second, he presumed that these so-called "badges 
of fraud" constituted fraud. Thus, the trial court's errors include (a) inferring actual 
intent, (b) viewing the "badges of fraud" as conclusive or absolute on the issue of intent 
rather than considering fraudulent intent as a question of fact, and (c) disregarding 
extensive offsetting facts, explanations and arguments refuting the notion that Wasatch's 
acquisition of the Section 32 interests was a fraudulent conveyance. Even if Reott were 
correct in asserting that Wasatch and BBC did not adequately dispute the substantive 
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facts cited as "badges of fraud/'1 an assertion that these appellants strongly contest, the 
trial court erred in embracing those "badges" as irrefutable evidence of fraudulent intent 
sufficient to permit the entry of partial summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance 
claim. See id.; Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co, v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353 f 
18, 144 P.3d 261 ("[T]he fact that there are other equally plausible inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence manifests that summary judgment should not have been granted."); 
Charvoz v. Cottrell, 361 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1961) ("[E]ven if the facts are undisputed, 
if fair-minded men can honestly draw different conclusions from them, the issue of 
negligence should be settled by a jury."); Anderson v. Bransford, 116 P. 1023, 1023 
(Utah 1911) (same: summary judgment is inappropriate where there are "different 
deductions or inferences arising from undisputed facts"). 
Apart from these legal errors, the record shows that Wasatch and BBC did fully 
and sufficiently dispute the materiality of the facts labeled by Reott and the trial court as 
"badges of fraud." To begin with, in the introductory statement to its reply to the 
"undisputed facts" as articulated by Reott below, Wasatch objected to those "facts" as 
being "mainly contentions regarding the legal meaning of the underlying documents — 
which, of course, are not [facts] at all, but legal argument. . . ." R. 4076-79. 
That Wasatch and BBC did not belabor this clear disregard for the mandates of 
1
 As he did below, Reott selects certain facts to include in his Appellee's Brief 
while disregarding facts that point to or would support a different result than that adopted 
by the trial court. Reott Br. at 2 - 9. Moreover, Reott inconsistently asserts in his brief 
that Wasatch and BBC failed to dispute sufficiently the material facts (Reott Br. at 9) and 
then later that "Reott's fraudulent transfer argument was unopposed" (Reott Br. at 39). 
Clearly it cannot be both; a close review of the record demonstrates that neither statement 
is correct. 
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56 by repeating the point as to each of the dozens of "undisputed facts" 
infected in this manner was simply a matter of economy, not concession. In fact, 
Wasatch did specifically restate the disputes regarding the "significance" and 
"materiality" of several of the most crucial facts in dispute, including Mr. Sutton's 
authority to act for Mission, the new lease issued to Wasatch by SITLA after it approved 
the Mission-Wasatch transfers, and Wasatch's "recording" of the lease transfers in the 
public records of SITLA versus the county recorder. R. 4076-78. Absent Reott's 
repeated spin (entirely appropriate at trial but not at the stage of summary adjudication), 
the facts he assembled were innocuous and of no legal consequence. Unvarnished facts 
detailing the sequence of events, the identities of the players, and the types of transactions 
were not in dispute (but did not and could not add up to fraud as a matter of law). What 
Wasatch and BBC have consistently disputed are the sinister inferences Reott asked the 
trial court to draw from those facts and which he now asks this Court to affirm on appeal. 
If the trial court felt compelled to reach issues of motive and equity, all Wasatch and 
BBC asked for was a trial: the opportunity to call live witnesses and otherwise to present 
evidence of the parties' true intent and the true course of the transactions. 
No further statement of dispute was required to prevent the entry of summary 
judgment. Wasatch's general objection echoed what the established standard for 
summary judgment already requires. Under Rule 56(e), a court may draw inferences 
from undisputed facts, but only in favor of the nonmoving parties. See, e.g., Tretheway v. 
Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 12 Tf 2, 995 P.2d 599; Butterfieldv. Okubu, 831 P.2d 
97, 107 (Utah 1992) ("doubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue 
4 
of material fact should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial"). The 
parties relied on this standard by invoking Rule 56. R. 2497, 3075 
More significantly, Wasatch documented extensive explanatory facts that, if 
believed by the trier of fact, would support a far different and more benign view of the 
Wasatch-Mission agreement and related transfer than that advocated by Reott and 
embraced by Judge Bryner. Wasatch did so in the statement of facts supporting 
Wasatch's cross-motion for summary judgment re: redemption (R. 2625-2633), in 
response to Reott's asserted facts regarding fraudulent conveyance (R. 4084-85), in 
affidavits, deposition testimony and other documents submitted in support of its 
memoranda (R. 2509-19, 2523-24, 2567-68, 2627, 3952-63, 4035-39), and elsewhere (R. 
2683-84, 3975, 5410). In addition, Wasatch and BBC argued against Reott's attempts to 
give the facts consequences that the law does not compel or that, at the summary 
judgment stage, required the trial court improperly to draw inferences. R. 3955-56, 3966, 
4088-4106.2 
All of these arguments were advanced to dispute the materiality of Reott's "facts" 
— to dispute their purported status as "badges of fraud." Wasatch's and BBC's opening 
brief details several examples, and gives record citations, demonstrating that Wasatch 
directly disputed the "badges of fraud" or offered additional evidence below that, if 
2
 In its reply memorandum, Wasatch specifically refuted Reott's contentions 
regarding the recording of the leases, notice, Mission's intent, Mr. Sutton's authority, 
SITLA's approval of the transfers, the scope of Reott's judgment liens, the amount of 
consideration paid by Wasatch, Wasatch's payments to maintain the Section 32 leases, 
and the purported requirements of Mission's operating agreement vis-a-vis its course of 
conduct. R. 4088-4106. 
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believed, would show that Reott's facts were not indicia of fraud and, thus, not 
"material." Appellants' Br 13-17, 41-43. Moreover, the disputes of fact are made all the 
clearer by Reott's repeated attempts to explain them away in his brief. Reott expends 
pages contesting the evidence regarding Mission's intent, Mr. Sutton's authority, the 
sufficiency of consideration for the Letter Agreement,3 and other "badges of fraud." 
Reott Br 29-36, 41-50. 
By accepting wholesale Reott's characterization of the evidence as "badges of 
fraud" when the facts in the record also supported a benign view of events, or a view 
favorable to Wasatch and BBC, and then drawing the inference of fraud from those 
alleged "badges," the trial court improperly weighed disputed evidence and resolved 
inconsistencies in favor of Reott, the moving party. Fact finding at either of these levels 
was error. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), properly applied, afford 
Wasatch and BBC the benefit of an evidentiary hearing regarding any claim that (a) the 
conduct of Wasatch or Mission rose to the level of "badges of fraud" and (b) the 
evidentiary weight accorded those alleged badges sufficed to support a finding of 
fraudulent intent. 
In summary, because the trial court both (1) found that certain facts were 
"material" as "badges of fraud" (when the meaning of those facts was clearly disputed in 
the record) and (2) drew the inference of fraud from the alleged "badges" (when the 
evidence would support other, benign explanations ), this Court should reverse or vacate 
Reott admits at page 44 of his Brief that "The sufficiency [i.e., amount] of 
consideration is disputed." 
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the entry of summary judgment on the fraudulent conveyance claim. Moreover, the 
Court should do so regardless of its holding on the redemption issue (discussed next) 
because the trial court's fraudulent conveyance findings have potentially far reaching 
impact in this litigation on remand. With a finding of fraudulent conveyance, Reott is 
poised to execute his $238,594 deficiency judgment (what remains of his judgments after 
deducting his $1.00 credit bid at the Sheriffs Sale) against other BBC leases without any 
opportunity for Wasatch and BBC to contest the fraud theory at a trial on the merits. 
II. REOTT CANNOT RAISE FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AFTER 
THE SHERIFF'S SALE, 
A. Reott Chose to Enforce His Liens at the Sheriffs Sale, Rather Than 
First Seek to Establish Fraudulent Conveyance as to the Section 32 
Interests, Thereby Electing His Remedy and Relinquishing Standing to 
Challenge Wasatch's Right of Redemption. 
Before the August 9, 2001 Sheriffs Sale, Reott as a judgment creditor had 
standing and full opportunity to challenge any party, including Wasatch, purporting to 
occupy a place in the chain of title at variance with or superior to the rights then held by 
Reott. The cases Reott now cites holding that a creditor can challenge another's claim of 
title on the basis of fraud support this proposition. See Olsen v. Bank ofEphraim, 93 
Utah 364, 68 P.2d 195, 198 (1937); Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984), 
abrogated on other grounds by RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935). 
However, nothing in these cases (or any other Utah case) supports Reott's further 
contention that a judgment creditor who neglects first to assert superior title but opts 
instead to execute on his judgments through a sheriffs sale, thereby obtaining full legal 
benefit of that superior title, can thereafter challenge a redemptioner's right to redeem. 
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It is black letter law in Utah that a lien that is executed through judgment and 
sheriffs sale is "exhausted]," "terminated," and "defunct," and "no further proceeding 
under it [is] possible." Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 77, 78 (Utah 1975); see also David 
A. Thomas and James J. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law, 
825 (LEXIS 1999) (the effect of the redemption is "as though the obligation had been 
paid without ever resorting to foreclosure" and the foreclosed lien "is extinguished"). 
The purchaser at the sheriffs sale acquires an interest in the property, but does so subject 
to the right of redemption. Utah R. Civ. P. 69(j). Redemption does not revive a 
foreclosed lien. See City Consumer Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 236 (Utah 1991) 
("The position of a junior lienor whose security is lost through a senior sale is different 
from that of a selling senior lienor. A selling senior can make certain that the security 
brings an amount equal to his claim against the debtor or the fair market value, whichever 
is less, simply by bidding in for that amount.'" (quoting RoseleafCorp. v. Chierghino, 59 
Cal.2d 35, 36 (1963) (Traynor, J.) (emphasis added))); Clawson, 535 P.2d at 78 
("[Redemption] gave no vitality to [the foreclosing party's] defunct claim."); cf. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (2006) ("There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or 
the enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate . . . .") . 
Here, Reott elected not to challenge Wasatch's claim of title when that opportunity 
was legally available to him. Instead, he took the more direct route of executing on his 
three judgments. Having chosen his remedy and successfully asserted the superiority of 
his rights, Reott relinquished his judgment creditor status by accepting his own $1.00 
credit bid at the Sheriffs Sale. 
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B. Reott's Real Concern Is His Own $1.00 Credit Bid. 
Had Reott bid the face amount of his judgments or the fair market value of the 
encumbered leases, the present dispute would never have arisen. Either he would have 
recovered the full value of his judgments or he would have obtained title to the property. 
Instead, he took the chance that no one would redeem against his $1.00 credit bid. 
Unfortunately for Reott, this gamble proved unwise, at least if the goal was to obtain the 
Section 32 interests, the Lavinia 1-32 Well and the BLM interests for the total sum of 
$1.00 and simultaneously preserve his judgments essentially intact to enforce against 
other properties. His nominal credit bid set the redemption amount at a correspondingly 
nominal amount. Thus, the belated attack on Wasatch embodied in this litigation seeks to 
undo the consequences of Reott's short-sighted strategy, a salvage attempt the law does 
not permit. 
Contrary to Reott's contentions, Mission's transfer of the Section 32 leases to 
Wasatch did not and was not intended to "keep the property away from Mission's 
creditors, such as Reott." Reott Br 11, 42-44. Reott was a secured creditor. Nothing 
Wasatch or anyone else could do would "keep the property away" from Reott. He had a 
protected interest in the leases, superior to that of Wasatch and fully insulated against any 
transfers, regardless of their terms. This no doubt explains why Reott elected not to 
challenge Wasatch's claim of title before the Sheriffs Sale. He could foreclose and 
extinguish Wasatch's interest. 
Moreover, Reott knew or should have known at the time of the Sheriffs Sale that 
Wasatch was a potential redemptioner. Reott's judgment liens attached to leases in 
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Section 32 that were numbered and maintained in public files by SITLA, as is customary 
in the industry. R. 2558-65, 2569-80. Indeed, Wasatch was the only party that 
realistically could have redeemed. Mission had abandoned the Section 32 leases 
following the transfer to Wasatch. Reott admits (Reott Br 32) that Wasatch exclusively 
operated and maintained the Section 32 leases, and Reott's counsel acknowledged in 
correspondence with the State of Utah that Wasatch received "an assignment of a Utah 
State mineral lease ... from Mission prior to the Sheriffs Sale," so it is clear that Reott 
was aware of Wasatch's interest in the leases. R. 4035-39, 2610-11. Notably, Reott 
contacted Wasatch by telephone the very day following the Sheriffs Sale to request 
access to Wasatch's pipeline. R. 2762. 
By credit bidding just $ 1.00 at the Sheriffs Sale, Reott voluntarily surrendered his 
secured status, extinguished his lien, and placed himself in the predicament in which he 
now finds himself. This was not Wasatch's doing and, whatever motive one might now 
ascribe to Mission or Wasatch in the transfer of the Section 32 interests, that transfer 
could not impact in the least Reott's status by reason of the Sheriffs Sale. 
C. Utah Law Prohibits Reott From Belatedly Asserting Fraudulent 
Conveyance to Control the Right of Redemption. 
The right of redemption exists as a check on undermarket bids. It is the 
undisputed policy of Utah to advance that purpose by liberally construing the rules and 
statutes permitting redemption. See United States v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah 
1976); Brockbank v. Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251 U 12, 32 P.3d 990; Tech-Fluid 
Services, Inc. v. Gavilan Operating, Inc., 787 P.2d 1328, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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This Court's decisions in Brockbank and Tech-Fluid dictate the outcome in this 
appeal. Reott's attempts to limit those decisions to their facts disregard the breadth and 
clarity of this Court's holdings in the two cases. Both cases are unequivocal in their 
statement of the law of redemption. Both prevented creditors who had underbid at a 
sheriffs sale from contesting the right of redemption, even when the redemption right 
was allegedly obtained by fraud {Brockbank) or the redemptioner's status as successor-
in-interest or its compliance with Rule 69 were questionable {Tech-Fluid). "The 
judgment creditor always has it in his power to make the land sold under execution of his 
judgment bring its real value, so that, if redemption is effected, he cannot be hurt"; thus, 
if the creditor underbids, he "should not now be heard to complain" — he is "bound by 
[his] choicesr Brockbank, 2001 UT 25 H 12 n. 3; Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1335 
(emphasis added). 
Brockbank specifically held that the purchaser at a sheriffs sale cannot assert 
fraud to defeat or control redemption: "[T]he transfer of the right of redemption cannot 
be a fraudulent conveyance," "notwithstanding any actual, subjective intent of [the 
debtor] 'to hinder, delay or defraud' the creditor." 2001 UT 251 ffif 12, 15 (emphasis 
added). "To allow a foreclosing creditor to control the right of redemption is inconsistent 
with the purpose of that right" because the amount the sheriffs sale purchaser bids "is 
within the creditor's control." Id. atffif 12, 14.4 
4
 Reott's attempt at page 21 of his brief to distinguish Brockbank by drawing a line 
between the transfer of the right of redemption in isolation and the transfer of that right as 
part of a bundle of rights in a property has neither intuitive nor case support. Certainly, 
this Court in Tech-Fluid attached no significance to the fact that the right of redemption 
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The only authorities Reott cites to support his contrary assertion that a sheriffs 
sale purchaser can challenge the right of redemption are four cases decided between the 
years of 1836 and 1912 by Alabama, Colorado, Iowa and New York state courts.5 Not 
one of these cases has ever been cited by a Utah court, and three have not been cited by 
any court on any point since 1938. Reott fails to direct this Court to any Utah cases or 
any contemporary or persuasive authority from any other jurisdiction purporting to 
counter this Court's decisions in Brockbank and Tech-Fluid. 
As a matter of Utah law, Reott has no claim or defense to Wasatch's redemption 
based on fraudulent conveyance. Having relinquished his judgment creditor status at the 
Sheriffs Sale and suffering no legal injury as a result of his own nominal credit bid (see 
Appellants' Br 24-30), he has no standing to defeat or control Wasatch's right of 
redemption.6 
III. WASATCH HAD A SUFFICIENT CLAIM TO AND INTEREST IN THE 
SECTION 32 LEASES TO REDEEM. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Claw son, supra, established that an 
equitable interest, even in one who may not have legal title, suffices to support a right of 
therein asserted was conveyed as part of a transfer of title rather than as an isolated 
transfer. 
5
 Phyfe v. Riley, 15 Wend. 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1836); Robertson v. Moline, 
Milburn & Stoddard Wagon Co., 55 N.W. 495, 496 (Iowa 1893); Francis v. White, 49 
Spo. 334, 335 (Ala. 1909); and Casserleigh v. Spar Consol Mining Co., 128 P. 863, 866 
(Colo. CtApp. 1912). 
6
 Reott claims that Wasatch did not raise this standing argument below. As with 
his various other contentions that Wasatch failed to raise an issue below, this contention 
is not correct and manifests a fundamental misunderstanding of Wasatch's consistent 
position in this litigation. The standing argument is central to Brockbank and Tech-Fluid, 
which Wasatch argued at great length below. See, e.g., R. 4096-97. 
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redemption. 535 P.2d at 78. Clawson involved a series of three separate executions 
against a property originally owned by Spaulding: First, Clawson executed on a 
judgment lien and bought the property at a sheriffs sale without redemption, terminating 
Spaulding's legal interest in the property. Next, Walker Bank foreclosed on a senior trust 
deed, but Spaulding redeemed. Finally, Walker Bank executed on its deficiency 
judgment against Spaulding, and an unrelated party purchased the property without 
redemption. Clawson sued to quiet title, challenging Spaulding's right to redeem at the 
second foreclosure sale because Spaulding had already "parted with all his interest in the 
land." Id. at 77-78. Notwithstanding, the court held it was "settled" that Spaulding had 
"sufficient interest in the property" because Walker Bank held a deficiency judgment 
against him and the amount of the sale affected that judgment. Id. at 78. 
Clearly under Clawson, legal title is not required, and a party has sufficient 
equitable interest if it has no more than a financial stake in the proceeding. This holding 
is consistent with Brockbank and Tech-Fluid and the policy announced in Loosley of 
liberally construing the redemption right as a check on undermarket bids. Brockbank, 
2001 UT 251 \ 12; Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1332; Loosley, 551 P.2d at 508. The holding 
is not consistent with the hyper-technical approach to title or the "balancing of equities" 
encouraged by Reott, and adopted by the trial court, as the measure of the redemption 
right. 
In the light of Clawson, Tech-Fluid and Brockbank, analysis of legal or equitable 
title for purposes of redemption does not require (or permit) a balancing of equities vis-a-
vis competing parties as argued by Reott. Rather, the point is merely to assess whether a 
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particular redemptioner has "sufficient interest in the property" to enable it to redeem. 
Clawson, 535 P.2d at 78. This is a low threshold made lower still by a sheriff sale 
purchaser's lack of standing to control or defeat the right of redemption and, in this case, 
by Mission's complete absence from the scene to seek redemption. To be sure, a 
complete stranger cannot suddenly appear and claim a right of redemption, but Wasatch 
was not such a stranger. As Tech-Fluid held, '"Successors in interest' clearly include 
assignees" as well as parties (such as Wasatch) that assume the operation of a mineral 
lease when a prior party (here, Mission) manifests an intent to abandon it. 787 P.2d at 
1331 n.3, 1332. 
Assessing title in this context is not a beauty contest. And Reott is off base in his 
Appellee's Brief to construe Wasatch's claim of equitable title as nothing more than an 
attempt to cure allegations of fraud. E.g., Reott Br 33-36 (addressing consideration 
supporting the Letter Agreement in terms of his fraud claim). As noted in Point I above, 
Wasatch and BBC vigorously dispute the trial court's findings of fraud, but more than 
that, the law prohibits Reott from even asserting fraud as a claim or defense to challenge 
Wasatch's right of redemption. Brockbank, 2001 UT 251 \ 12. The decisions of this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court consistently teach that a redemptioner's right of 
redemption must be assessed on its own merits — notwithstanding any competing claims 
"It is inconsistent to suggest that a [party], having abandoned property and 
consequently being divested of all interest therein, would still retain a right to redeem, at 
least absent some expressed and unambiguous intent by the [party] to retain that right." 
Tech-Fluid, 787 P.2d at 1332. Mission abandoned the Section 32 interests after their 
transfer to Wasatch. Thereafter, as Reott and his counsel well knew, Wasatch exclusively 
operated and maintained the properties. See infra Part II.B. 
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or even allegations of fraud — with an eye to the liberal policies favoring redemption. 
This approach comports with the standard maxim in quiet title cases that the parties must 
prevail on the strength of their own title, not the defects in the title of another. See 
Mercur Coalition Mining Co. v. Cannon, 112 Utah 13, 184 P.2d 341, 342 (1947); 
Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 862 (1939).8 
Wasatch asserts both legal and equitable claims to the Section 32 interests. 
Substantial evidence, improperly disregarded by the trial court, confirms that Wasatch is 
entitled to redeem as Mission's successor in interest. This evidence includes: 
• The Letter Agreement - Wasatch obtained a valid Letter Agreement from 
Mission promising the transfer of the Section 32 interests. Wasatch gave 
consideration, including a payment of $3,696.40, the assumption of 
Mission's financial obligations to SITLA, and a right of first refusal for a 
Were it appropriate to balance the equities and were Reott able to assert a claim 
of fraud as a means of defeating Wasatch's right to redeem, it would still be wrong to 
balance the equities in the way Reott proposes because to do so would give him a 
windfall. Wasatch did not redeem the Lavinia 1-32 Well (an asset of some value), which 
Reott acquired with his $1.00 credit bid. It is worth remembering that the practical effect 
of affirming the trial court's partial summary judgment would be to award Reott all of the 
Section 32 interests for the price of the same $1.00 credit bid and, further, to permit him 
to seek enforcement of the remaining $238,594 deficiency judgment against all other 
BBC leases in Carbon County that were originally transferred by Mission to Wasatch. 
Even in Horton, on which Reott relies (but which did not involve a redemption), 
the court held, "It is not the intent of equity actions such as this to punish a transgressor 
or to permit any party, whether innocent or not, to reap a benefit from the fraudulent 
transaction " Thus, the court subordinated the defrauded party's property interest to 
other creditors to prevent him from reaping a windfall. 695 P.2d at 107 (emphasis 
added). Here, the very purpose of Utah's policy of liberally construing the right of 
redemption is to prevent a windfall from an undermarket bid. See Loosely,551 P.2d at 
508. 
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future drilling deal (a promise that remained in force at the time of the 
Sheriffs Sale and Wasatch's redemption notice).9 
• Execution of the SITLA Assignment Forms - Consistent with the Letter 
Agreement, Mission's manager executed SITLA assignment forms 
transferring the Section 32 interests in the same manner other forms and 
documents had been executed, including documents executed for the 
benefit of Reott. Reott admits that Mr. Sutton "purported" to transfer the 
Section 32 interests on behalf of Mission (R. 2656), and Wasatch 
acknowledged receipt from "Mission" on the back of the forms (R. 2558, 
2562). 
• SITLA Transfer of Lease Interests to Wasatch - SITLA approved the 
assignments and executed documents transferring the Section 32 interests 
from Mission to Wasatch. Indeed, SITLA partitioned lease ML 43541 and 
signed a new lease with Wasatch (ML 43541 A) that allowed Mission to 
retain the Lavinia 1-32 Well, which Wasatch did not acquire and which 
now belongs to Reott.10 
9
 Reott contends that Wasatch's promise to allow Mission to participate in a future 
drilling deal was illusory and, thus, did not constitute consideration. Reott Br 33-34. 
However, the Supreme Court in Coulter (discussed at length in the Appelants' Brief (38-
39)) explicitly rejected the argument that a promise is not consideration simply because 
the promisor "was not bound to proceed." Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 
852, 859 (Utah 1985). "It is not necessary for the promisor to render performance in 
order for us to find consideration; the reciprocal promise is sufficient consideration to 
form a contract." Id. 
10
 Under SITLA rules, "No assignment or sublease is effective until approval is 
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• Mission's Abandonment of Leases - Mission abandoned all of the Section 
32 leases except for the lease covering the Lavinia 1-32 Well. Thus, as of 
the date of the Sheriffs Sale, only Wasatch stood in a position to exercise 
the right of redemption with respect to the Section 32 interests. 
• Wasatch's Operation and Maintenance of the Leases - Wasatch exclusively 
maintained and operated the leases, paying rents and other amounts that, if 
not paid, would have resulted in termination of the leases, rendering them 
valueless. Wasatch paid $4,590 to SITLA,11 and undertook other 
geological and engineering work to preserve the leases. (See Tab H to 
Appellants' Brief). 
In summary, the Supreme Court's ruling in Claw son allows one with funds tied up 
in a property purchased at a sheriffs sale to protect that investment, however modest, by 
redeeming the property. Wasatch not only invested in the Section 32 leases and paid 
consideration to Mission for their transfer, but Wasatch also obtained SITLA's approval 
and (as in Tech-Fluid) operated the leases after Mission abandoned them. Wasatch was 
not a stranger to Section 32 but rather was the sole involved party as of the date of the 
Sheriffs Sale. Each of the actions taken by Wasatch, standing alone, gave Wasatch an 
interest in Section 32 sufficient to support exercise of the right of redemption, especially 
given. Any assignment or sublease made without approval is void." Utah Admin. Code 
R850-20-2200.5(b). As a result, SITLA's approval and issuance of the new lease are 
evidence of an assignment of the Section 32 interests to Wasatch. 
11
 Reott's argument notwithstanding (Reott Br 32), Wasatch clearly presented this 
figure below. R. 4035-39. 
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under the established policy of liberally construing rules "dealing with redemption" to 
prevent the sheriffs sale from becoming "an instrument of oppression." Loosley, 551 
P.2d at 508. 
CONCLUSION 
In Utah, the right of redemption is a check on under-market bids. Reotf s $1.00 
credit bid was clearly below market value. That bid alone, and not any action taken by 
Mission, Wasatch or BBC, gave rise to Reotf s frustration and spurred his attack on 
Wasatch's exercise of the right of redemption in this case. Reott declined to challenge 
the bona fides of the Mission-Wasatch transaction when that opportunity was legally 
available to him (he had no need to do so because he was a secured creditor), but instead 
proceeded to execute on his judgment liens through the means of a Sheriffs Sale. There, 
he made an improvident gamble. He extinguished his liens for a bid of $1.00, 
presumably hoping that no one would seek redemption and he could pocket a windfall: 
mineral rights to four sections and a $238,594 deficiency judgment. Having misjudged 
the facts and the law, Reott demands that the courts remedy the consequences of his 
misjudgment, consequences for which he is solely responsible. 
This Court's precedents mandate a different result. Brockbank and Tech-Fluid are 
controlling and preclude Reott from attempting to manipulate the redemption process to 
avoid the consequences arising from the events he set in motion by his nominal bid at the 
Sheriffs Sale. Wasatch is entitled to redeem the Section 32 interests, and the trial court's 
entry of summary judgment to the contrary was error. This Court should reverse and 
enter judgment on the redemption issue in favor of Wasatch and BBC as a matter of law. 
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In addition, the Court should reverse or vacate the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to Reott on his claim/defense of fraudulent conveyance because the trial court 
impermissibly (1) found that disputed facts were "material" as "badges of fraud" and (2) 
inferred fraud from those "badges of fraud" when the facts in the record also supported a 
contrary, benign view of events. A finding of fraud as to any aspect of Mission's 
dealings with Wasatch must await a trial on the merits. 
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